/usr/java/default/bin/keytool -import -trustcacerts -file -alias CA_ALIAS -keystore /usr/java/default/lib/security/cacerts -storepass changeit
More:
openssl s_client -connect:IPAddress:443
after connection is established, type in “HEAD / HTTP/1.0” and press enter.
Alternative:
echo -e "HEAD / HTTP/1.0\n\n" | openssl s_client -quiet -connect IPAddress:443
openssl s_client -connect:IPAddress:563
openssl s_client -connect:IPAddress:993
openssl s_client -connect:IPAddress:995
openssl s_client -connect website:443 -cipher EXPORT40 openssl s_client -connect website:443 -cipher NULL openssl s_client -connect website:443 -cipher HIGH
openssl passwd -1 -salt QIGCa pippo
output: $1$QIGCa$/ruJs8AvmrkmzKTzM2TYE.
openssl pkcs12 -in CertFile.p12 -out NewCertFile.pem -nodes. -cacerts
openssl x509 -in CertFile.crt. -inform DER -out NewCertName.pem -outform PEM
openssl s_client-connect ProxyHostname:port proxycert.pem
openssl genrsa -des3 -out server.key 1024
openssl req -new -key server.key -out server.csr
cp server.key server.key.org openssl rsa -in server.key.org -out server.key
openssl x509 -req -days 365 -in server.csr -signkey server.key -out server.crt cat server.crt server.key > certificate.pem
cat INFILE | openssl aes-256-ecb -salt -k PASSWORD > INFILE.ssl
cat INFILE.ssl | openssl aes-256-ecb -d -k PASSWORD > INFILE
From: nmap-hackers-bounces@insecure.org On Behalf Of Fyodor Sent: Monday, December 2011.12.05 17:36 To: nmap-hackers@insecure.org Subject: C|Net Download.Com is now bundling Nmap with malware! Hi Folks. I've just discovered that C|Net's Download.Com site has started wrapping their Nmap downloads (as well as other free software like VLC) in a trojan installer which does things like installing a sketchy "StartNow" toolbar, changing the user's default search engine to Microsoft Bing, and changing their home page to Microsoft's MSN. The way it works is that C|Net's download page (screenshot attached) offers what they claim to be Nmap's Windows installer. They even provide the correct file size for our official installer. But users actually get a Cnet-created trojan installer. That program does the dirty work before downloading and executing Nmap's real installer. Of course the problem is that users often just click through installer screens, trusting that download.com gave them the real installer and knowing that the Nmap project wouldn't put malicious code in our installer. Then the next time the user opens their browser, they find that their computer is hosed with crappy toolbars, Bing searches, Microsoft as their home page, and whatever other shenanigans the software performs! The worst thing is that users will think we (Nmap Project) did this to them! I took and attached a screen shot of the C|Net trojan Nmap installer in action. Note how they use our registered "Nmap" trademark in big letters right above the malware "special offer" as if we somehow endorsed or allowed this. Of course they also violated our trademark by claiming this download is an Nmap installer when we have nothing to do with the proprietary trojan installer. In addition to the deception and trademark violation, and potential violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, this clearly violates Nmap's copyright. This is exactly why Nmap isn't under the plain GPL. Our license (http://nmap.org/book/man-legal.html) specifically adds a clause forbidding software which "integrates/includes/aggregates Nmap into a proprietary executable installer" unless that software itself conforms to various GPL requirements (this proprietary C|Net download.com software and the toolbar don't). We've long known that malicious parties might try to distribute a trojan Nmap installer, but we never thought it would be C|Net's Download.com, which is owned by CBS! And we never thought Microsoft would be sponsoring this activity! It is worth noting that C|Net's exact schemes vary. Here is a story about their shenanigans: http://www.extremetech.com/computing/93504-download-com-wraps-downloads-in-bloatware-lies-about-motivations It is interesting to compare the trojaned VLC screenshot in that article with the Nmap one I've attached. In that case, the user just clicks "Next step" to have their machine infected. And they wrote "SAFE, TRUSTED, AND SPYWARE FREE" in the trojan-VLC title bar. It is telling that they decided to remove that statement in their newer trojan installer. In fact, if we UPX-unpack the Trojan CNet executable and send it to VirusTotal.com, it is detected as malware by Panda, McAfee, F-Secure, etc: http://bit.ly/cnet-nmap-vt According to Download.com's own stats, hundreds of people download the trojan Nmap installer every week! So the first order of business is to notify the community so that nobody else falls for this scheme. Please help spread the word. Of course the next step is to go after C|Net until they stop doing this for ALL of the software they distribute. So far, the most they have offered is: "If you would like to opt out of the Download.com Installer you can submit a request to cnet-installer@cbsinteractive.com. All opt-out requests are carefully reviewed on a case-by-case basis." In other words, "we'll violate your trademarks and copyright and squandering your goodwill until you tell us to stop, and then we'll consider your request 'on a case-by-case basis' depending on how much money we make from infecting your users and how scary your legal threat is. [...] |
Related: “SourceForge has lost its common sense” – https://eikonal.wordpress.com/2015/06/03/sourceforge-has-lost-its-common-sense/
Related content at this blog:
>>> from passlib.hash import sha256_crypt
>>> hash = sha256_crypt.encrypt("password")
>>> hash
'$5$rounds=80000$9GPMLb8EE.1QFrUk$Y0XQiZRKMhOrB2GcfCeWREG.x3jCfa5pbmxSO/hjCE3'
>>> sha256_crypt.encrypt("password")
'$5$rounds=80000$9fjOxTQNeyPhsCvp$XmyKju3TfWUEPXGPXMZ6sIPcv26Uok7NLPyZhx5g7R9'
>>> sha256_crypt.encrypt("password", rounds=12345)
'$5$rounds=12345$Kk9DTJPMRyxGFB3q$7tdzdJXq4YRu7ms6PGo7zTlOHVwYOQO1aUeUsZ3Mrl5'
>>> sha256_crypt.verify("password", hash)
True
>>> sha256_crypt.verify("letmeinplz", hash)
False
>>> from passlib.hash import atlassian_pbkdf2_sha1
>>> atlassian_pbkdf2_sha1.encrypt("password")
'{PKCS5S2}fU8ppRTCuJeS8n7PGYOQMhVqZ4hUidTIiWI4K8R8IBOXm/lYywaouSLtvlTeTr3V'
>>> atlassian_pbkdf2_sha1.encrypt("password")
'{PKCS5S2}+X+PMcYYAwBAKIWwFsJY639EipU1NXJfc1jKC5VYHZV7zoDI4zTEpKO4xZQoegg1'
>>> atlassian_pbkdf2_sha1.encrypt("password")
'{PKCS5S2}1Nq7N2YM4ZyTstZaSynlnGGh2rgAG+b7SB+9xreszUhrE39BnfwNg2RGm6tqvDg2'
>>> atlassian_pbkdf2_sha1.encrypt("password")
'{PKCS5S2}bu1dK0WotXYuBaB0bo2RslxMAp4JawLofUFw4S5fZdAtfsm3Ats6kO6j5NaHZCdt'
>>> atlassian_pbkdf2_sha1.encrypt("password")
'{PKCS5S2}z/mfc47xvjcm5Ny7dw7BeExB68Oc4XiTJvUS5HRAadKr4/Aomn1WOMMrMWtikUPK'
Sources:
Sources:
#!/bin/sh
#
# Goran Cvetanoski - 19/12/2006
#
# pwage
#
# This script works out the time left before a password expires
#
# It will send a reminder email 10 days and 3 days before the password
# will expire. The email will go to unix.admin@mydomain.com.au unless an
# alternate email address is specified. An email will also be sent if a
# password has expired.
#
# The following command will send results to unix.admin@mydomain.com.au
# pwage oracle
#
# Specify an alternate email address if you would like the results to be
# sent to a different email address.
# ie:
# pwage oracle oracledba@mydomain.com.au
#
#
# CHANGE LOG
# =========================================================================
# 19/12/2006 - Goran Base script created
# 05/08/2009 - Ricky Smith added code to check each user
#
LOG=/tmp/pwage.log
DASHES="-----------------------------"
show()
{
echo "$DASHES $1 $DASHES" >> $LOG
shift
eval "$@" >> $LOG
echo "" >> $LOG
}
SendMail()
{
cat $LOG | mailx -s "$1" "$2"
}
reminder ()
{
echo "Date: `date`"
echo ""
echo "Please change your password within the next $EXPIRE days"
}
expired ()
{
echo "Date: `date`"
echo ""
echo "The password for $USER has expired"
echo "$USER last changed their password on $LSTCNG"
echo "The maximum age for the password is $MAX days"
echo "and it has expired $EXPIRE days ago"
}
CheckUser()
{
USER=$1
EMAIL=$2
CURRENT_EPOCH=`grep $USER /etc/shadow | cut -d: -f3`
if [ "$CURRENT_EPOCH" = "" ]; then
return
fi
# Find the epoch time since the user's password was last changed
EPOCH=`perl -e 'print int(time/(60*60*24))'`
# Compute the age of the user's password
AGE=`echo $EPOCH - $CURRENT_EPOCH | bc`
# Compute and display the number of days until password expiration
MAX=`grep $USER /etc/shadow | cut -d: -f5`
if [ "$MAX" = "" ]; then
return
fi
EXPIRE=`echo $MAX - $AGE | bc`
CHANGE=`echo $CURRENT_EPOCH + 1 | bc`
LSTCNG="`perl -e 'print scalar localtime('$CHANGE' * 24 *3600);'`"
WARN=`grep $USER /etc/shadow | cut -d: -f6`
if [ "$WARN" = "" ]; then
WARN=0
fi
if [ "$EXPIRE" -le "$WARN" ]; then
show "R E M I N D E R" reminder
SendMail "$USER Password Info On `uname -n`" "$EMAIL"
elif [ "$EXPIRE" -lt 0 ]; then
show "E X P I R E D" expired
SendMail "WARNING: $USER Password Expired On `uname -n`" "$EMAIL"
fi
}
# Main Code
domain=$1
if [ "$domain" = "" ]; then
domain=$(dnsdomainname)
fi
minuid=$2
if [ "$minuid" = "" ]; then
minuid=500
fi
IFS=':'
while read user pass uid gid full home shell
do
if [ $uid -ge $minuid ]; then
cat /dev/null > $LOG
CheckUser $user "\"$full\" "
fi
done </etc/passwd
|
#%PAM-1.0 auth required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so shadow auth required /lib/security/pam_nologin.so account required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so password required /lib/security/pam_cracklib.so password required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so use_authtok nullok md5 shadow session required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so |
#%PAM-1.0 auth sufficient /lib/security/pam_ldap.so auth required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so shadow auth required /lib/security/pam_nologin.so account sufficient /lib/security/pam_ldap.so account required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so password required /lib/security/pam_cracklib.so password sufficient /lib/security/pam_ldap.so password required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so shadow nullok use_authtok session sufficient /lib/security/pam_ldap.so session required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so |
#%PAM-1.0 auth requisite pam_nologin.so auth required pam_env.so readenv=1 auth required pam_env.so readenv=1 envfile=/etc/default/locale auth sufficient pam_succeed_if.so user ingroup nopasswdlogin @include common-auth auth optional pam_gnome_keyring.so @include common-account session [success=ok ignore=ignore module_unknown=ignore default=bad] pam_selinux.so close session required pam_limits.so @include common-session session [success=ok ignore=ignore module_unknown=ignore default=bad] pam_selinux.so open session optional pam_gnome_keyring.so auto_start @include common-password |
Each line has format:
module-type control-flag module-path arguments
Since recently Skype started peddling its new versions in a forceful way by downloading the update to the users PC, and then throwing the large update notification window to the desktop forefront. It is not possible to disable this behaviour. It is so annoying that I will probably switch to some alternative provider of online voip.
